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Saturday, July 02, 2005

Biology as Ideology

Since people are talking about Alon Levy's essay, Biology Is Not Ideology, a critique of Lewontin's Biology As Ideology: The Doctrine of DNA, I thought I'd open up a thread for it here.

Maybe later, when I get a chance, I'll throw in my two cents about the book, too.


Oh, heck, here's a little bit of a critique.

I'm going to have to disagree completely with Alon—he has misread the book. He says he read it expecting to find it "full of cheap shots at science" and concludes that "Lewontin is a popularizer of anti-science". I have the advantage of being familiar with Lewontin's work, though. He is the Alexander Aggasiz Research Professor at the Museum of Comparative Zoology, Harvard University. He has an incredible research record. He is most definitely not anti-science, anti-evolution, or anti-genetics—he has been a pioneer in those fields. He's a very smart cookie and a great writer. He also has his own biases—he's Marxist and proud of it—and isn't immune to error. But viewing this book through the lens of an assumption that Lewontin penned an anti-science screed has distorted his interpretations.

For instance, take a look at the conclusion of Lewontin's first chapter.

While these examples are meant to disillusion the reader about the objectivity and vision of transcendent truth claimed by scientists, they are not intended to be antiscientific or to suggest that we should give up science in favor of, say, astrology or thinking beautiful thoughts. Rather, they are meant to acquaint the reader with the truth about science as a social activity and to promote reasonable skepticism about the sweeping claims that modern science makes to an understanding of human existence. There is a difference between skepticism and cynicism, for the former can lead to action and the latter only to passivity. So these pages have a political end, too, which is to encourage the readers not to leave science to the experts, not to be mystified by it, but to demand a sophisticated scientific understanding in which everyone can share.

This mistake runs throughout Alon's essay. Over and over again, he accuses Lewontin of "attacking" science, for example,

Besides attacking the fundamental tenets of scientific research, the book also attacks certain specific concepts, which I will deal with now. First, I will talk about the heritability of IQ, which Lewontin denies; and then, I will defend the Human Genome Project, which he attacks as useless and ideological.

This is most peculiar. A biologist well known for the rigor of his research is attacking fundamental tenets of research? Where? You won't find it anywhere in Biology as Ideology, I'm afraid. Instead, Lewontin is criticizing flawed assumptions drawn from modern science.

IQ is a good example, but I'd rather not get into that long muddle right now. Alon makes a number of mistakes here, taking for granted that "heritability" means what he thinks it means ("heritability" is a very narrow, specific parameter in genetics, one that is frequently conveniently elided to new colloquial meanings by those who want to argue for racial theories of intelligence), that twin studies have adequately excluded environmental factors, and even that we can realistically dissociate the innate from the environmental. One of the things that Lewontin hammers on repeatedly is that latter misconception; it's one of the major ideological fallacies of much of modern biology.

Alon's claim that Lewontin attacks the HGP as useless is false, and that it is ideological is simply correct.

What Lewontin actually criticizes about the HGP are the claims that it will teach us "how life works" or that it will provide a "complete blueprint" for humanity. I suspect that he actually feels about genomic data as I do: it's a wonderful, powerful tool for comparative research, it tells us much about our genetic history, and it is a major aid for doing science, but it tells us nothing about individuals and has a long, long way to go before we understand all those other processes and interactions that are necessary for a cell to function. It's grossly incomplete.

Where ideology comes into play is in the reluctance to recognize that last fact. But of course ideology biases science. Of course economics and ideological expectations warp what kind of science gets funded. To deny that the Human Genome Project was driven by ideological issues is to deny reality. It doesn't mean it was useless or that we haven't gained anything from it. We should be aware that many of the central advocates of the HGP profited hugely from it. Ideology is everywhere, and it doesn't help to turn a blind eye to it.

For instance, Science recently published their Top 25 Questions Facing Science and one of them had me flabbergasted: Why Do Humans Have So Few Genes? That isn't a science question at all—it's more sociology than anything. It's all about the surprise to many scientists that we "only" had 25-30,000 genes. I run into these strange articles all the time where people try to rationalize this, as if it were some problem that fish and mustard plants have more genes than we do. But why should we expect people to have more genes than a pufferfish? Why is 25,000 considered too few—we don't even know what most of them do! Just the fact that one of the major science journals thinks this is a pressing issue tells you something.

I'm afraid I read Biology as Ideology and agreed with just about everything Lewontin said. But then, I didn't go into it assuming that he was "attacking" all of science. Rather, he's advocating a realistic examination of how the social enterprise of science impinges on the objective execution of science.


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Comments:
#30642: — 07/03  at  06:52 AM
From Loren Petrich's comment:

Lewontin sneers,
Many of the most fundamental claims of science are against common sense and seem absurd on their face. Do physicists really expect me to accept without serious qualms that the pungent cheese that I had for lunch is really made up of tiny, tasteless, odorless, colorless packets of energy with nothing but empty space between them?

I invite him to go to a beach and make some sand castles and teach himself a lesson in emergent properties -- collectives of sand grains have some properties very different from those of individual sand grains.

Toward the end, he seems to be making a plea for scientists to incorporate gods and demons and so forth into their hypotheses; he ought to address the question of how those hypotheses would be tested.
-------------------
While I have not read Lewontin's book either (it is now on my list), I must say that Lewontin most likely is not "sneering". Rather, he is showing the attitude, often unspoken, of the general public toward science. I have observed the phenomenon myself when talking to people at my church (they are fundies, I am not) and debating my friends at work. Americans are in general ignorant of the advances made in science since 1850. They accept that a TV works, but have no idea HOW. They know that reporduction works, but are largely ignorant of meiosis, etc.

We need to address the fact that education does seem somewhat lacking in terms of required classes at the elementary and high-school levels. There is also the matter of attitude toward education expressed by students and their parents. The Jerry Springer Show provides some interesting anecdotal evidence for that.



#30643: Arun — 07/03  at  07:08 AM
Alon Levy does seem to have a case, now I'll have to go read Lewontin to decide for myself.



#30645: — 07/03  at  07:33 AM

Except for the entire argument, you didn't miss anything.


Don't flatter yourself. Has it occurred to you that denouncing a research professor of evolutionary biology at Harvard (i.e. one producing an ongoing stream of scientific research) as having the arguments of 'an anti-scientific crackpot' when other scientists (a) think your reading is quite, quite wrong, (b) when your views on the subject are so extreme as to use incendiary terms like the above, plus terms like "insane".

Surely some sort of introspection is called for?
"Hmmmm, I seem to be using very extreme language, I'm calling a research scientist at Harvard anti-scientific, and there are these scientists disagreeing with my reading ... Could I be wrong.... Nah! Couldn't be me!"

By the way, just as a note to how wrong you've got it: 'Saying that modern science is reductionistic because of ideology is plain wrong' ?! Look, you've got a nice writing style, but on the basis of this I doubt you'd be much use at attaching a horse to a cart.



#30646: Alon Levy — 07/03  at  07:38 AM
Okay, let’s try again, PZ, now without Windows 98 killing my reply.

This is most peculiar. A biologist well known for the rigor of his research is attacking fundamental tenets of research? Where? You won't find it anywhere in Biology as Ideology, I'm afraid. Instead, Lewontin is criticizing flawed assumptions drawn from modern science.

What I’m talking about is Lewontin’s criticism of objectivity and empiricism. If you read what, say, Alan Sokal says about science and objectivity, you’ll see he admits that science can be swayed by financial or other interests and says it’s important to investigate these influences. But Lewontin goes far beyond that; he claims that the scientific principles of objectivity and empiricism are flawed by asserting that science as an institution is inherently non-objective and non-empirical.

IQ is a good example, but I'd rather not get into that long muddle right now. Alon makes a number of mistakes here, taking for granted that "heritability" means what he thinks it means ("heritability" is a very narrow, specific parameter in genetics, one that is frequently conveniently elided to new colloquial meanings by those who want to argue for racial theories of intelligence), that twin studies have adequately excluded environmental factors, and even that we can realistically dissociate the innate from the environmental. One of the things that Lewontin hammers on repeatedly is that latter misconception; it's one of the major ideological fallacies of much of modern biology.

When I say “heritability,” I’m essentially quoting previous studies about the heritability of IQ. I presume that Eric Turkhemier used heritability in the precise genetic sense when he concluded that the heritability of IQ was 0.1 for families of low socioeconomic status and 0.72 for families of middle and high SES. This study, if true, refutes not just the environment-only hypothesis Lewontin advocates but also the racist and classist hypotheses that Lewontin claims underlie IQ research. Incidentally, this study circumvents all of Lewontin’s criticisms about properly controlling for environmental factors, because what matters most about it is the fact that there’s a huge difference between low-SES heritability and middle- and high-SES heritability. After all, if an improperly controlled for effect inflates heritability, it should inflate heritability equally regardless of class. To attack this study’s control factors you must find factors that exist only or almost only in middle- and high-SES families.

Alon's claim that Lewontin attacks the HGP as useless is false, and that it is ideological is simply correct.

Can you explain what ideology guided the HGP? Note that scientific views are different from ideologies, so to show that genetic determinism is an ideology rather than a scientific view you need to show that its proponents use it to justify a political ideology. For example, Richard Herrnstein is a good example of someone who does, whereas Richard Dawkins is a good example of someone who doesn’t.

Let me quote coturnix here: “While Dawkins, pushed by critics and the evidence has inched back step by step (and yes, his books have gotten somewhat less ridiculous over time) he has not made the final step because if he did there would be nothing left as Dawkinsian - he would just plain agree with the rest of the world, i.e., there would be no difference between Dawkins' understanding of the world and that of more sophisticated modern thinkers and biologists.” This is a prime example of how a scientist’s ego influences his work. But it isn’t ideology; Dawkins would only be guilty of subordinating science to ideology if he used his genetic determinism to justify inequality or ram religion (which he doesn’t—he uses memetics for that).

What Lewontin actually criticizes about the HGP are the claims that it will teach us "how life works" or that it will provide a "complete blueprint" for humanity. I suspect that he actually feels about genomic data as I do: it's a wonderful, powerful tool for comparative research, it tells us much about our genetic history, and it is a major aid for doing science, but it tells us nothing about individuals and has a long, long way to go before we understand all those other processes and interactions that are necessary for a cell to function. It's grossly incomplete.

Maybe Lewontin feels that way, but he certainly doesn’t give the impression in Biology as Ideology. He attacks basic research, arguing that it has no practical uses. Whereas he finishes the first chapter with a moderating comment (despite the chapter’s body being scathing and caustic), he only intensifies his criticism at the end of the fourth chapter, which deals with the HGP.

Where ideology comes into play is in the reluctance to recognize that last fact. But of course ideology biases science. Of course economics and ideological expectations warp what kind of science gets funded.

Lewontin claims a lot more than that. Sokal says exactly what you’re saying here in the caveats to his defense of science. Lewontin claims that science is inherently ideological, which is different from saying it can be subject to ideology. On the contrary, on page 8 Lewontin derides a view only slightly weaker than yours: “scientists truly believe that except for the unwanted intrusions of ignorant politicians, science is above the social fray”—note that this is meant to contrast what scientists believe and how things really happen. The sort of ideological warping of the scale Lewontin says happens hasn’t happened since eugenics was abandoned.

To deny that the Human Genome Project was driven by ideological issues is to deny reality. It doesn't mean it was useless or that we haven't gained anything from it. We should be aware that many of the central advocates of the HGP profited hugely from it. Ideology is everywhere, and it doesn't help to turn a blind eye to it.

Lewontin claims exactly that—he says that basic science, which includes the HGP, has no medical applications.



#30647: Alon Levy — 07/03  at  07:47 AM
Don't flatter yourself. Has it occurred to you that denouncing a research professor of evolutionary biology at Harvard (i.e. one producing an ongoing stream of scientific research) as having the arguments of 'an anti-scientific crackpot' when other scientists (a) think your reading is quite, quite wrong, (b) when your views on the subject are so extreme as to use incendiary terms like the above, plus terms like "insane".

Which part of "in this article I will mostly refrain from attacking Lewontin's biology" did you fail to understand? The book is predominantly about social science - how science is done and how it relates to social structures, to be precise - with biology only providing the backdrop. Lewontin is as qualified to talk about legitimization as Larry Summers is to talk about gender differences in cognition or Noam Chomsky is to talk about foreign policy.



#30649: — 07/03  at  08:08 AM
I had the interesting (to put it one way) experience of covering Biology as Ideology</b> in a graduate level "science studies" course. Alon's criticisms are exactly to the money if those sympathetic to postmodernism in my class were representative; moreover, I agree with the interpretation of some of the more egregious passages. (Though I think the book is not quite as bad as Alon makes out.) What really struck me when I read it (going on memory here) was the claim that there was no known genetic basis for any disease or condition that affected human behaviour. I happen to own a genetics text that was coauthored by Lewontin himself. Guess what: the behavioural effects of trisomy 21 (aka Down's Syndrome) are discussed. I wondered at the time why on earth he would make such a claim in the popularization. (The Massey lectures, BTW, are IIRC radio lectures given to a popular audience.)

The class also included a student presentation on the text and a discussion with Lewontin himself. I got the impression that he (and perhaps my instructors, though it was impossible to be sure) tries to "play both sides against the middle" in the "science war". He criticized the sociologists etc. of science who (like I would say) seem to know very little science, social or (worse) otherwise as well as the Norman Levitts, Alan Sokals and so on of the world for not understanding the social context of science. (This is unfair, as Alon has pointed out. It is also not true that philosophers needed the prodding of the pomos to take the social context of science seriously. They are of course inconsistent on the point since they often regard Bacon as the father of modern science - ridiculous, really, except for his social contribution, whence the inconsistency. Other philosophers of science since then have also stressed the social "matrix" of science.)

It is important to realize that Lewontin's remarks of the sort Alon has extracted are exactly the same sort of thing that B. Latour, H. Collins, and other postmodern sociologists (etc.) of science mention. Sure, they say more mild and reasonable (or platitudinous) things elsewhere, and in the case of Lewontin, I agree, he certainly knows more genetics than me or anyone else I've met. But that doesn't make him immune to misunderstanding science as a process or activity. I argued in my final paper for the class that virtually every single work we studied made the same sort of error: assuming that their discipline (rhetoric, sociology, even my own philosophy, history, etc.) could conclude, on its own, how science works. Lewontin here counts as a sociologist of science in <i>B as I
, because that's in essence what he is doing. (Were this an academic paper I would defend that claim.) Nothing wrong with sociology of science, BTW: Stephen Cole (for example) seems to recognize his discipline's limitations.

As for reductionism, well, there is a lot of confusion and lack of mutual understanding on this topic. Philosophers tend to use the one way, scientists others. What it seems most scientists mean when they say they they are reductionists and defend reductionism is actually monism, the thesis that there is one sort of stuff. I would argue that science is now monistic - in particular it tacitly adopts (for reasons I leave to the literature) a materialist monism.

Reductionism in the other, more philosophical sense, though it appears that biologists use it this way too (Hi, PZ) involves a denial of emergent properties. Nobody is a reductionist in this sense. The claim is more interesting when it comes to how one should handle emergence. Contemporary emergentist philosophers (e.g. Mario Bunge) do not assert that emergent properties are unpredictable: instead explaining their emergence from the underlying components and the environment and structure is an interesting task of science. (Consider a molecule: molecules have pretty much well defined shapes, albeit ones in flux. How do they get these from the more shapeless atoms that compose them? Ditto for the atoms and the still more shapeless elementary particles.) The question is then an epistemic one: scientists or philosophers accused of being greedy reductionists are actually, it seems to me, being accused of, to put it simply, oversimplification: not recognizing that certain properties are emergent (asserting that they are resultant properties (e.g. mass of a molecule vis-a-vis its atoms, for example), or that their explanation fails to account for some things.

Notice that in the latter case the "greedies" are accused of ignoring social factors. This is sometimes true, but it is interesting that one has to explain the origin of social factors too - there's a feedback cycle there, which (as everyone on all sides realizes) makes for a very difficult problem.

(phew!)



's avatar #30651: PZ Myers — 07/03  at  08:17 AM
Variability in the IQ studies by socioeconomic status would seem to me to support the importance of environmental factors. Or don't you think class effects the environment of children?

The chapters titled "Causes and effects" and "Dreams of the human genome" go into great detail on the ideological underpinnings of the HGP. Here, for instance:
Why, then, do so many powerful, famous, successful, and extremely intelligent scientists want to sequence the human genome? The answer is, in part, that they are so completely devoted to the ideology of simple unitary causes that they believe in the efficacy of the research and do not ask themselves more complicated questions.
He doesn't criticize basic research. He critices the premises on which it was justified.

The HGP has no medical applications yet. I'm glad it was done, because it is a wonderful tool...but let's not delude ourselves. That's what Lewontin is saying -- many have presented the HGP as a great resource for solving human ills, when what it really is is a way to see into the genetic history of life on earth.

PZ Myers
Division of Science and Math
University of Minnesota, Morris



#30652: Raven — 07/03  at  08:18 AM
Kristjan wrote:

I don't believe we have a selection bias towards negative examples, otherwise how would you explain all the annecdotal evidence given? I can't really say what we have instead, but it's something else.


Well, mine was strictly argumentum ex rectum, as evo-psych arguments are, but I find Gerd Gigerenzer's assertion that erring on the side of aversion to the even potentially negative increases survival value by diminishing risk a plausible construct. I freely admit that it's just an idea, not that I have any evidence for it at this point.



#30655: Alon Levy — 07/03  at  09:02 AM
Variability in the IQ studies by socioeconomic status would seem to me to support the importance of environmental factors. Or don't you think class effects the environment of children?

Of course it supports the importance of environmental factors. But Turkheimer's study supports a particular combination of environment and genetics that Lewontin ridicules.

He doesn't criticize basic research. He critices the premises on which it was justified.

He criticizes basic research in other parts of the book. In particular, he talks about how medicine is "empirical" rather than scientific. On pages 42-44, he tries to show how the bulk of the decrease in mortality over tha last 200 years is due to social rather than scientific causes, but to do that he falsifies reality (Koch didn't invent germ theory, and he underestimates the increase in life expectancy at 60 by a factor of 14).

Why, then, do so many powerful, famous, successful, and extremely intelligent scientists want to sequence the human genome? The answer is, in part, that they are so completely devoted to the ideology of simple unitary causes that they believe in the efficacy of the research and do not ask themselves more complicated questions.

This isn't ideology. Lewontin tries to connect unitary causes to political ideology, but he fails. In fact unitary causes are an attempt to simplify nature that veers into the territory of oversimplification. There are so many external factors that can make scientists abandon empiricism apart from ideology - money, ego, optimism about a project, and the feel-good factor (it's easier to sequence genes than to study environmental influences, hence everything there is to know about humans is in the human genome) come to mind.



#30658: Alon Levy — 07/03  at  09:32 AM
By the way, Raven, Chris, I've been meaning to thank you for your kind words about my article since you posted them, but I kept forgetting. So thank your Chris and thank you Raven.



#30659: — 07/03  at  09:38 AM
I am not in any way qualified to participate in this discussion, but I find it facinating (except for the few personal attacks). It's worth noticing that even when people disagree about something, it can happen in a way that provides knowledge for the people observing the debate.



's avatar #30660: Chris Clarke — 07/03  at  09:57 AM
Lewontin is as qualified to talk about legitimization as Larry Summers is to talk about gender differences in cognition or Noam Chomsky is to talk about foreign policy.


This is the amusing thing about this entire thread, Alon. You attack Lewontin for claiming that science is political, and the whole of your argument is shot through with an alarmingly clumsy and ill-informed political resentment. Though I appreciate your attempt at even-handedness by including Summers above, can you really honestly believe you can say that Chomsky is not "qualified to talk about foreign policy" - regardless of whether you agree with what he says, which is a different matter entirely - without knowing that you come across as a buffoon?

Actually, Lewontin does claim that this is the primary purpose of science. I'm basing this observation on the following quotes:
1. "What Darwin did was take early-nineteenth-century political economy and expand it to include all of natural economy" (p. 10).
2. "Science... is a supremely social institution, reflecting and reinforcing the dominant values and views of society at each historical epoch" (p. 9).
3. "So, the ideology of modern science, including modern biology, makes the atom or individual the causal source of all the properties of larger collections" (p. 13).
4. "This [biological determinism] is the view that the old society was chatacerized by artifical barriers to equality, whereas the new society allows a natural sorting process to decide who is to get the status, wealth, and power and who is not" (p. 20).

Every single one of these quotes is false; the first three are also marks of an anti-scientific crackpot.


You have been provided with abundant evidence to the contrary in this very thread. You have provided no evidence to back up your assertions other than repeating them with increasing fervor. In arguing against the evidence you've been provided, you cherry-pick what you respond to and ignore the empirical data (as you did when you responded to my comment about Malthus by again downplaying Malthus' influence on Darwin's thought, eliding the passage in which Darwin himself gives Malthus credit for the germ of the natural selection idea.

If there is an anti-scientific crackpot in this thread, it is not Lewontin.

Those "false," "crackpot" statements you deride are accepted as truth to some degree by the vast majority of scientists of my acquaintance. The first one is, despite your grossly incompetent misreading of it, literally true by Darwin's admission, and you have been provided that admission as evidence in this thread, though you chose to ignore it. The second is so widely accepted among scientists as to be considered trite, a caution along the lines of "remember to clean your glassware" or "beware Type II errors," except with far less practical application in day-to-day work. Look for modern writing on the theoretical work of C. Hart Merriam as an example. Vegetative ecologists still fight the notion that plant succession after disturbance is an orderly progression through one transitional state after another to a "climax," a pernicious and widespread idea that reflects the "Progress" bias of western society and not incidentally greatly benefits the clearcutting and grazing industry. That's not anti-scientific crackpottery: the scientists are largely on my side in that one. Statement three can be suppported trivially by looking through newspapers for discussion of the "Gay Gene".

I could go on.

"I do not think we should antagonize the religious when it is not warranted, though I think we should be willing to do so whenever it is.”
-- Glen Davidson



's avatar #30661: Chris Clarke — 07/03  at  09:59 AM
By the way, Raven, Chris, I've been meaning to thank you for your kind words about my article since you posted them, but I kept forgetting. So thank your Chris and thank you Raven.


I hold to that compliment, Alon, despite my subsequent criticism of your points. You're an engaging writer.

"I do not think we should antagonize the religious when it is not warranted, though I think we should be willing to do so whenever it is.”
-- Glen Davidson



#30663: — 07/03  at  10:08 AM
many have presented the HGP as a great resource for solving human ills
I thought that was done deliberately (and cynically) in order to obtain funding from the ill-educated relatively anti-science politicians and public; whereas the researchers themselves were in it more for the pure information (though not in the least discounting the hope of getting some useful medical applications!).



#30664: Arun — 07/03  at  10:21 AM
Alon wrote:

n extensive study done by Eric Turkheimer and published in Psychological Science in November 2003 shows that in middle- and upper-class families, IQ has very high heritability, whereas in lower-class families environmental factors predominate and genes contribute almost nothing to variation in intelligence. The explanation for that is that everyone has a certain potential for intelligence that is mostly genetic, but low socioeconomic status can prevent people from realizing their full potentials. Lewontin calls this the empty bucket or innate capacity metaphor and derides it, "But there is no more biology in the innate capacity metaphor than there is in the notion of fixed genetic effects." But now we know that the innate capacity metaphor is exactly right..

and

When I say “heritability,” I’m essentially quoting previous studies about the heritability of IQ. I presume that Eric Turkhemier used heritability in the precise genetic sense when he concluded that the heritability of IQ was 0.1 for families of low socioeconomic status and 0.72 for families of middle and high SES.

Trying to understand this. Please indicate right or wrong.

First, I assume Heritability of some measured property (say IQ) in a population is defined as (variance of property due to genetic reasons)/(total variance of property).

Thus, suppose I measure the IQs of a large number of people in an age-group in families of high SES. Suppose I get a nice Bell curve, with average 100 and standard deviation of 12, variance of 144. Then, the heritability of IQ in families in high SES is 0.72 means that if I restrict myself to a large genetically identical subset of this population (not really possible in humans, but perhaps possible in those funny fire-ants PZMyers wrote about), then 0.72 of the variation would vanish. i.e, measurement on this subset would yield a Bell curve with some average and a variance of (1-0.72) * 144 = 40.3, or a standard deviation of 6.3. Similarly, if the curve I first described was instead the IQ distribution of families of low SES, then the subset would yield a Bell curve with some average, and a variance of (1 - 0.1) * 144 = 129.6 or standard deviation of 11.4.

The above is what I take to be the meaning of Turkheimer's findings. Notice, we can't say anything about the average of our subpopulation, it could be different from 100; heritability doesn't say anything about it.

What is the meaning of "full potential"? Does "full potential" mean more than three standard deviations above the average? (i.e., 99th percentile or better?) Or is "full potential" represented by the average? Is the innate capacity metaphor the claim that two genetically identical populations, one put into low SES and other put into high SES will have the same 99th percentile IQ score? The same average IQ score? The same 6-sigma score ( 1 in a billion)? How does Turkheimer's findings shed any light on the innate capacity metaphor?

Do you notice something, by the way - a mean of 100 and standard deviation of 11.4, means about 2.5% of that population has a score above 123. A mean of hundred and a standard deviation of 6.3 has many less IQ-smart people, only 2.5% of the population has a score above 113. smile



#30666: Arun — 07/03  at  10:41 AM
Thus, for instance, if population of clones, when put in low SES environment, has a standard deviation of IQ of 11.4 and when put in a high SES environment, has a standard deviation of 6.3, and by "innate capacity" or "full potential" we mean the value exceeded by only 2.5% of the sample (2 sigma), then if our clones have a "full potential" of 125, we're predicting that in low SES the clones will have mean of 125 - 2*11.4 or around 102, and in high SES, the clones will have a mean of 125 - 2 * 6.3 or around 112. Is there evidence for this type of finding anywhere, in Turkheimer or elsewhere?

(Maybe there is a better way to look at this, but the only way I know how to evaluate a general claim is to get specific.)



#30668: Alon Levy — 07/03  at  10:49 AM
This is the amusing thing about this entire thread, Alon. You attack Lewontin for claiming that science is political, and the whole of your argument is shot through with an alarmingly clumsy and ill-informed political resentment. Though I appreciate your attempt at even-handedness by including Summers above, can you really honestly believe you can say that Chomsky is not "qualified to talk about foreign policy" - regardless of whether you agree with what he says, which is a different matter entirely - without knowing that you come across as a buffoon?

Why do I come across as a buffoon? I'm not claiming that I'm more qualified than Lewontin to write about politics or that I'm as qualified as Lewontin to write about biology. You talk about evidence a lot, so where is your evidence that Biology as Ideology is about biology rather than about sociology and politics of science?

You have provided no evidence to back up your assertions other than repeating them with increasing fervor.

Which assertions? If you're talking about the one that Lewontin thinks science's primary purpose is to legitimize the social structure, I'm providing quotes from the book in order to prove that. If you're talking about the one that Darwinism stood on its own merits, you're partly right. I haven't provided evidence that Darwinism stood on its own merits, but I have provided evidence that it didn't stand on Malthus's, namely reference to the prevailing view of the world at the time.

In arguing against the evidence you've been provided, you cherry-pick what you respond to and ignore the empirical data (as you did when you responded to my comment about Malthus by again downplaying Malthus' influence on Darwin's thought, eliding the passage in which Darwin himself gives Malthus credit for the germ of the natural selection idea.

I didn't include it in my quote, Chris, for the reason that my primary argument here is not about what convinced Darwin that natural selection was correct but about what convinced the other biologists that natural selection was correct.

Those "false," "crackpot" statements you deride are accepted as truth to some degree by the vast majority of scientists of my acquaintance. The first one is, despite your grossly incompetent misreading of it, literally true by Darwin's admission, and you have been provided that admission as evidence in this thread, though you chose to ignore it.

According to your quote, Darwin claims he read Malthus in 10/1838. But that was when he already had massive evidence for natural selection; the sources I can find aren't clear on whether he developed the theory of natural selection before or after 10/1838 - from what I've read I'm fairly sure he did in 1838, but I have no idea in what month.

The second is so widely accepted among scientists as to be considered trite, a caution along the lines of "remember to clean your glassware" or "beware Type II errors," except with far less practical application in day-to-day work. Look for modern writing on the theoretical work of C. Hart Merriam as an example. Vegetative ecologists still fight the notion that plant succession after disturbance is an orderly progression through one transitional state after another to a "climax," a pernicious and widespread idea that reflects the "Progress" bias of western society and not incidentally greatly benefits the clearcutting and grazing industry.

What kind of caution is that? If it's as trivial as not making type II errors, then why do people think it's somehow in the nature of science to legitimize social structure when no one thinks it's in its nature to make type II errors? As for vegetative ecologists, you'll have to give me some link to explain the situation to me, because from what I know people generally consider human tampering with the environment always bad.

Statement three can be suppported trivially by looking through newspapers for discussion of the "Gay Gene".

Why does it support Lewontin's third statement? Frontline's feature on that says that a scientist found, or thought he found, a genetic basis for male homosexuality.



#30669: Arun — 07/03  at  10:59 AM
One last - to me (physics, engineering background) there is a vague distinction between a technology project and a science project. To me, the Human Genome Project was more about technology than science, like the lunar Apollo program. Another large technology program was the Manhattan project for the A-bomb. I think, if one accepts the vague distinction, that technology programs are much more tied to prevailing ideology in society, etc., than science programs.



#30671: — 07/03  at  11:14 AM
Which part of "in this article I will mostly refrain from attacking Lewontin's biology" did you fail to understand? The book is predominantly about social science - how science is done and how it relates to social structures, to be precise - with biology only providing the backdrop. Lewontin is as qualified to talk about legitimization as Larry Summers is to talk about gender differences in cognition or Noam Chomsky is to talk about foreign policy.


Well, you clearly haven't understood what I wrote, then.

(Which puts me in the same category as Richard Lewontin, yay!).

I'll repeat: in the face of massive criticism of your extreme misreading of the book, you don't at any point introspectively consider you may in fact be wrong, but instead, as coturnix writes:
You have provided no evidence to back up your assertions other than repeating them with increasing fervor.


I'd better explain then. Here were go.
'Saying that modern science is reductionistic because of ideology is plain wrong' is not his argument. If it were his argument, the book would be called Ideology as Biology. What he is arguing is that biology has in many cases, and has continued to do so even with very recent scientific projects, produced ongoing ideologically influenced reductionist perspectives YET! whilst these perspectives are drawn from biology and permeate it ideologically as a *social institution*, as a scientist, it is not necessary to agree with them:

"Look!" He says, "I'm a leading scientist and I don't. I think they get in the way of doing good science!"

What's your response?

"Insane... antiscience crackpot"

Hmmmm.



#30672: Alon Levy — 07/03  at  11:15 AM
If these are all technology projects, then can you give any examples of science projects?



#30673: Alex Merz — 07/03  at  11:21 AM
I have not read Lewontin's book, but I've read most of the essays that he has published in the NYRoB over the last 15 years or so. I don't agree with many of his conclusions about how biology as a science operates, either. But to call Lewontin "anti-science" is ridiculous, and could be done only by someone ignorant of (or choosing to ignore) his substantial contributions.

Something that I think is being missed here is the intellectual environment within which Lewontin cut his teeth: Harvard in the 1960s-1980s, where a narrow version of the reductionist paradigm in biology was being pursued extremely aggressively, and what we might today call "integrative biology" was in many cases being pushed to the periphery by J. Watson and his colleagues. These pressures caused, for example, E.O. Wilson to leave the Biology Department for the Agassiz Museum (see Wilson's memoir for a long discussion). Lewontin arguably was more responsible than anyone else for the fusion of molecular biology with quantitative genetics and evolutionary biology. One need only read how Watson's text Molecular Biology of the Gene is structured as a series of declarative statements about how genes operate to see that a biologist predominantly interested in genetic diversity could take offense at some of the assumptions underlying its program (disclosure: my Chair was a coauthor of that excellent book).

What we are dealing with is one of the oldest schisms in biology: lumpers versus splitters. Those who want to study commonalities (e.g., universality of molecular mechanism; "the" human genome) versus those who want to explain diversity (e.g. population genetic structure). If one does not understand these debates or this history (and Alon appears not to), I think that Lewontin's essays are easily misconstrued.

Now, all that said, I think that in large measure Lewontin is still fighting the battles of ten and twenty and thirty years ago, and for reasons rather different than those highlighted by Levy, I think that Lewontin is choosing to miss the fact that at least some of the tensions within biology that most concern him are dissipating, as quantitative genetics and biological diversity once again become central concerns of big-G (no pun intended) Genetics.

In addition, my readings of his essays lead me to suspect that Lewontin, who has spent his entire career at Harvard, sees the whole of biology through the lens of his experience at that particular institution. And in many ways, that experience is probably not representative. Lewontin's views may be profoundly influenced by his professional and history within that particular elite institution. The irony is that these are the sorts of influences on scientific practice that many of Lewontin's essays focus upon.



#30675: coturnix — 07/03  at  11:26 AM
Alex, you are correct and I have heard Lewontin himself stating that, of course, he as a scientist is colored by his own social environment and biases.



#30677: Raven — 07/03  at  11:39 AM
As for reductionism, well, there is a lot of confusion and lack of mutual understanding on this topic. Philosophers tend to use the one way, scientists others.


I think you're on to something here, Keith. I would just add that laypeople may use it in a combination of ways, or mean something else entirely. In my classes on systematic evaluation of massage research, very few of the students are philosophers or scientists or for that matter "loons" (by which I mean people who've made up their mind against science and won't receive input to the contrary. Actually, I prefer the term "woo-woo" as it doesn't slander perfectly good birds, but when in Pharyngula...).

Mainly, they have not been exposed to science very much, but will listen to what I have to say with an open mind. They do have a sense of respect for the complexity of what it means to be human, and they are a little suspicious of what they have heard to be the "reductionism" of science, concerned that it may seek to deny that complexity, but beyond that, the idea of reductionism is often not more fully formed. So confronting it head on and listening to their concerns helps to defuse those concerns.

Reductionism in the other, more philosophical sense, though it appears that biologists use it this way too (Hi, PZ) involves a denial of emergent properties. Nobody is a reductionist in this sense.


I think (and again, I am talking strictly out of my ass, because this is purely anecdotal evidence based on my observations) that there is a difference on this point between clinicians and scientists, and among scientists, between the physical and mathematical scientists and the biological scientists, and that it has to do with the ability to build models of their discipline.

Models are necessary to science--even PZ doesn't study every zebrafish in the world, but rather uses some zebrafish as models for the rest. Similarly, people look at cancer in rats and other animals as a model for disease in humans. The important question then becomes how well does the model map to what it purports to represent (which is why that ghastly article that gave PZ brainlock in the other thread fails--he never demonstrates why his software model should be taken as a good map to DNA, by the way).

Until recently, good mathematical tools for modeling biology haven't existed (with a few notable exceptions: partial differential equations can model a few small things, like blood flow--but no overall large phenomena have lent themselves to a purely quantitative desciption). So models in biology have been very subjective as a result in comparison to physical science models. On the other hand, in physics, mathematical models have existed for a very long time, and physicists have already grappled with issues that biologists are just now having to confront in mathematics, such as tractability (ability to compute using reasonable amount of time and computing power) vs. expressivity (richness of description). The fact that biological models were more relatively subjective previously also allowed more expressivity without compromising tractability at the time. Now, trying to fit the newer mathematical and computational tools to biology, without losing the previous expressivity to too great a degree, brings these issues to the fore.

Which leads to another point Keith made:
The question is then an epistemic one: scientists or philosophers accused of being greedy reductionists are actually, it seems to me, being accused of, to put it simply, oversimplification: not recognizing that certain properties are emergent (asserting that they are resultant properties (e.g. mass of a molecule vis-a-vis its atoms, for example), or that their explanation fails to account for some things.


Which is what my students fear, but not at a level they can be hyperverbal about--they are concerned that scientific reductionism (increased tractability) will make them somehow less wonderful and miraculous as humans (decreased expressivity). When these meta-factual concerns are addressed (à la Lewontin), they are then in a position to receive and process the facts (à la Sagan). If I did the Sagan "just the facts, ma'am" approach only, I don't think it would be received in that audience of non-scientists.



#30680: Alon Levy — 07/03  at  11:46 AM
Tigerbear, you haven't read my article, have you? Because either you don't know that I refuted his claims about legitimization, or you have read them and don't care. You keep saying his being a scientist necessarily makes him pro-science; will you also chide someone who thinks Foucault and Derrida practice extreme anti-intellectualism because Foucault and Derrida are intellectuals?

Alex, I'm fairly certain one can attack the reductionist paradigm of biology without involving the rest of science in the battle or talking about how science legitimizes social structures.



#30681: Alon Levy — 07/03  at  11:46 AM
What the innate capacity metaphor says is that there is a highly heritable potential distributed with average greater than 100 (say 110, to pull a number out of thin air), which the environment can then modify. According to Turkheimer, the environment can only modify the potential IQ downward, and does so only in low-SES people.



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