#1152: Michael Harris — 03/16  at  11:03 AM
Re: Van Dyke's citation of "Project Steve".

....and here I thought law students had superior reading comprehension skills.

It also brings to mind the old adage of never attributing to malice what can be chalked up as plain stupidity.

#1153: — 03/16  at  11:37 AM
In response to the last post someone said that for purely selfish reasons everyone in this country should have a science education. I disagree. I think that for the good of our society as a whole
a) every person who goes to college should get a liberal education
b) a liberal education involves a semi-rigorous look at physics, chemistry, biology, and mathematics
i am amazed how many people think they are getting a liberal education have no interest in learning about science, yet think that they should have an opinion on things like stem-cell research
Robert Brandom, my teacher and one of the best philosophers currently writing, recently said to Pitt's board of trustee's:
"This underlines what is wrong with thinking of our students as customers, whose desires ought to drive our offerings. If we just give the students what they want, half of them would do nothing but channel-surf through undemanding courses on the symbolism of the Matrix movies and what the popularity of reality TV says about contemporary culture — with lots of video-viewing time.

A somewhat better model than that of commercial customer is that of professional client, in relation, for instance, to a doctor or lawyer. No one with any sense goes to their counselor and says: Prescribe this drug for me in this dosage, or file a lawsuit for me under this section of the Uniform Commercial Code. One goes instead for access to a different kind of judgment and advice, which one wants to take account of a whole range of possibilities and constraints initially visible only to the professional.

The case of university-level instruction is even further out on this spectrum. What we have to offer is in no small part instruction about what sort of education the students should be pursuing, what is worth reading, learning, thinking and writing about — and what counts as doing that. The students come to us to become familiar with, and be held to standards of excellence of various sorts, as much as for our specific knowledge."

#1154: PZ Myers — 03/16  at  11:48 AM
I agree wholeheartedly (since I'm teaching at a liberal arts university, I'd better). I'd like to see general science made more widely accessible in the curriculum, and that we have more of a commitment to exposing the student body as a whole to some science...but not that everyone needs to be a science major.

All of our students will be faced with issues at some point in their life that demand some understanding of science. They will be diagnosed with cancer. They will hear a report that groundwater in their area is contaminated. The public school their kids go to will announce changes to their health curriculum. While they don't need the level of biological training that will equip them with immediate answers to those kinds of problems, they do need the kind of broad appreciation of scientific thinking that will allow them to figure out rational answers.

#1155: — 03/16  at  02:51 PM
I agree with you as well, Patrick. I think for the welfare of society and the good of it's individual citizens, exposure to science, especially what differentiates science from other forms of knowledge-gathering, is vital. Every time I get into a debate with a creationist, we usually end up discussing just what science is because most of their misconceptions about evolution are based on a simplified and highly inaccurate understanding of science. It's a large part of why I find the current method of injecting creationist thought into biology by teaching the "controversy" of evolution as so insidious. They are trying to subvert science to get their unscientific "truth" established as fact and by extension damage the understanding of science as a whole. It does a disservice to society in favor of a rather narrow agenda that has nothing but reaffirming a small fundamentalist group's faith at it's core. In fact, it could be said that the real conflict is within Christianity and that "Godless science" is simply seen as a pawn to be used by the fundamentalists.

My earlier comment was my selfish statment that I want to never reapeat myself again when it comes to creationists. I wish everyone had a good enough understanding of science that it would become apparent just how ansti-science creationism is. I think that the best way to do that is to make sure every individual gets a good enough understanding of science by the time that they graduate from high school. I believe that this can be done, but it will take some adjusting of post-elementary education and the current attitude about "accountability" is going to stand in the way.

Anyway, like I said, I think we agree. I just probably needed to be a bit more in-depth in my other point.

#1156: — 03/16  at  10:01 PM
In trashing VanDyke's book review, we should be careful not
to lose sight of what the book that VanDyke reviewed is about.

The work in question is Law, Darwinism & Public Education,
by Francis Beckwith. The purpose of this book is to argue that
it is not illegal to include "Intelligent Design" in public
school curricula, and particularly science classes. Science is a
part of Beckwith's argument, but only a part. The rest is mostly
an examination of the "freedom of religion" jurisprudence that
has been used in evolution/creationism legal cases.
Historically, creationism has been prohibited from science
curricula in public schools because the courts have decided that
it was really "religion." The "establishment clause" of the
First Amendment to the Constitution forbids the government from
preferring one religion over another, or religion over non-
religion. Since, according to most court decisions, creationism
is religion, it may not be taught in the schools.

Beckwith argues that this jurisprudence is flawed, and that
in any event does not apply to ID which, he claims, is not the
same as historical creationism and is not "religious" in a way
that would offend the First Amendment. ID, as defined by its
proponents, argues that an "intelligent designer" is a legitimate
explanation for "origins;" that some sort of intelligent creative
entity is a legitimate postulate for why things are as they are.
Most ID proponents readily acknowledge that they think such a
"creator" is probably supernatural, and probably God. But
they insist that this is not necessarily the case, and that
therefore ID is not inherently religious because "all" it
purports to show is that there is "something" out there beyond
the "naturalistic" explanations of orthodox science. And, they
say, what they want to include in the school curricula is "just"
that an intelligent creative entity of some sort is a possibility
for which evidence exists, and not the nature of any such entity.

Science is, of course, a part of the ID argument. IDers say
that there is scientific evidence supporting the existence of an
intelligent creative entity. Orthodox science says this is bunk. (Orthodox science does not say, or at least
need not say, that there is no intelligent creative entity out
there, but only that the purportedly scientific arguments
propounded by the ID crowd do not show this.) The
orthodox scientific response is often that the IDers are
engaged in bad science, or nonscience. Bad science is not
constitutionally prohibited. Only religion is. Many scientists go further, and say that the ID case is not science at all, but really religion masquerading as science. Notice that this move has two steps, that the ID arguments are not science at all, and that the ID arguments are really religion. It is only the latter that implicates constitutional considerations. It is
not unconstitutional to teach "not science" in the public
schools, even in science classes, for the same reasons that it is
not unconstitutional to teach "bad science."

Traditionally, in the evolution/creationism legal cases,
evolutionists have persuaded courts that creationism is "not
science" at all, and this has been taken as evidence that it is
religion. There is continuing dispute within science (and philosophy of science) about what "is" and "is not" science. Beckwith examines this question both in terms of how it has been applied to the traditional creationism legal cases and also how it should be applied to the "new" ID "challenge." He concludes that the historical jurisprudence on the point is flawed, and that in any event ID is different enough from
traditional creationism to warrant a reevaluation. There are
lots of people who have jurisprudential reservations about the
traditional court holdings that creationism is "not science."
Beckwith may be wrong in his conclusion that the jurisprudence is
flawed, but he is not alone. Nor is he alone in suggesting that
the traditional jurisprudence of the creationism cases is subject
to criticism. The reasoning of freedom of religion cases in
general, and in the creationism cases in particular, has been the
subject of significant criticism. Some would even say that the
legal issues are intractable.

Nor is the contention that ID is "different" enough from
traditional creationism to warrant reevaluation so crazy, at
least on its face. ID's contention that its "creator" does not
necessarily mean God is not obviously nuts. It is pretty clear
that the motives of the IDiots (there, my bias is out) are
religious. While their "theory" does not necessarily compel God,
they certainly hope and expect that their "intelligent designer"
will be God. But their motives may or may not be important, or
even relevant, to either the science or legal questions. If
the question is whether some purported piece of science is any
good (or science at all), what difference does it make if the
proponents were motivated by religious or nonreligious
considerations? The validity (or invalidity) of the conclusions
reached by an inquiry should stand on their own. Does it really
make any difference that Newton was, at least in part,
religiously motivated? Grant that the religious motives of the
ID crowd are "transparent." So what? (Two sitting Supreme Court
Justices have asked this question.) Similarly, why should it
make any difference to validity if a conclusion from some inquiry
"permits" (or even compels) a religious interpretation? If
that's what an inquiry legitimately supports, then so be it.

There is certainly warrant for concluding that creationism, including ID, is "not science" (or bad science) and that it is essentially religious. This still may not adequately answer the questions. One could still challenge the view that the First Amendment prohibits incorporating nonscientific,
religious subject matter into the school curricula. One could
argue that the historical legal understanding of "separation of church and state" is wrong, and also that the First Amendment does not (or at least should not) prohibit teaching ID in the schools even if it is religious. Again, this argument has two parts. Arguing that current freedom of religion
jurisprudence is wrong is a fairly mainstream jurisprudential
position, but even if the arguments are successful that would not
automatically entail the conclusion that "proper" jurisprudence
would permit teaching ID in the schools. This latter argument
is less mainstream in the legal arena, but it's not unknown and
it cannot be rejected out of hand.

Don't lose sight of the legal question -- or the fact that
ultimately this is a legal question (and a legitimate one, at
least traditionally). It is not whether teaching ID in science
classes is a good educational practice. (Some reputable,
orthodox science teachers apparently think it's fine; Will
Provine at Cornell, for one.) Nor is it whether ID is "true," or
any variation on that theme. It is whether it is legally
permissible under the Constitution to teach it in public schools.
That depends (among other things) on what "freedom of religion" means, and that is a jursprudential question and not primarily a scientific one.

There is more than science to the evolution/creationism
controversy. That does not mean that science is not important to
the question, nor does it mean that anyone need give even a
moment's credence to the so-called "science" of creationism,
including ID. It's bunk. It's not real science (or it's such
bad science that it shouldn't be called science). It may well be
a bad idea to teach it for precisely these reasons. It's
religion, and maybe it's a bad idea to teach it for that reason,
as well. But that depends on different, or at least additional, considerations, and we'd be naive (and wrong) to think they are irrelevant, because they're not.

#1157: Nic — 03/16  at  11:08 PM
In reply to Jeff, I'd note that one of the important points in church-state separation cases is whether or not there is a secular purpose for whatever action is under discussion. If there is a secular purpose, the courts give it thumbs up, but if the purpose is sectarian, thumbs down.

I would argue that if some body of work is established to be bad science (= wrong, or worse, "not even wrong"), then this also removes any potential secular purpose for it being taught in science class. This would be step 1 of a legal challenge to ID.

Step 2 would then be to show that the actual purpose of the teaching of ID materials is sectarian. I think that the path is quite clear here, the ID advocates really don't seem to be able to help themselves in this regard.

I think that this legal strategy *should* work. Whether or not it *will* work with the current courts is highly up in the air IMO.

#1158: — 03/17  at  02:53 AM
Re: Nic:

Yes. To date the good guys have almost always won the court cases. So far, so good. The claim is that ID raises different questions than have been raised before, and/or that the existing jurisprudence is wrong. Beckwith and others outline the new arguments. They are, I think, more creative (!) than persuasive and I'd rather have our side than theirs, but it would be a mistake to ignore this front.

#1159: Francis J. Beckwith — 03/20  at  12:50 AM
Jeff:

Thank you for your generally accurate overview of my book. My only disagreement is that I do not make a judgment as to the correctness of the holdings in the creation/evolution cases except to say that in the case of McLean v. Arkansas that Judge Overton's definition of science was anachrostic and came under strong post-trial criticism by several philosophers of science including Larry Laudan and Phil Quinn, neither of whom is a creationist or even a proponent of intelligent design. (I do address other aspects of McLean as they may be applied to ID, but as you correctly point out, such an analysis would have to include a different set of jurisprudential considerations).

My opinion (for what it's worth) is that these cases were rightly decided, for the statutes under consideration (especially in McLean and Edwards) clearly had no secular purpose since they were transparent attempts to insert the Book of Genesis into public school curricula.

My work is quite modest in its ambitions, and quite conservative in its suggestions. Once again, to repeat what I have told others several times, my work deals very little with biology and more with the philosophy of science, demarcation theories, and conceptual questions about science and what counts as "knowledge." Don't get me wrong, I have a much higher regard for ID than its most vocal critics do. In fact, I think that the arguments of its advocates are interesting and serious. But I have no horse in this race. For instance, if you had to pin me down on what view I hold on these matters, I am not settled. When I was younger I was a theistic evolutionist, though I think now there are some interesting conceptual difficulties in holding this position. In fact, of all the theistic proofs, the design argument is the least compelling for me (though I understand that ID advocates don't think of their work as doing more than possibly offering support to theism in the same way that physicalist views of mind offer support to naturalism). I am a fan of the kalam argument, Plantinga's ontological argument, and most recently, the moral argument, which I defend in an article entitled, "Why I Am Not a Relativist," which you can get for free off my website francisbeckwith.com.

I do not hold, and have never held, the view that ID should be taught in public schools. In fact, in several interviews (including in a recent talk at Texas Tech Law School) I have maintained it is not a good idea to teach ID in public schools at the present time because its publication record in the biological sciences is thin. However, one could conceivably, without violating the Constitution, include some ID-type material in the sections of a textbook that deal with philosophy and history of science (which these textbooks sometimes do address), and here I am thinking of M. Rea, A. Plantinga, R. Koons type arguments. But whether such a move is sound pedagogy is a question outside of my interests and areas of specialty. This is the main reason why I turned down an invitation to speak to the Texas state board of education in September 2003. The other reason was that my July 2003 testimony was so misconstrued and uncharitably interpreted that I thought it best to let my published work speak for itself, which is better accomplished when it is assessed on its own merits and taken out of the context of the volatility of Texas textbook politics.

#1160: PZ Myers — 03/20  at  07:34 AM
That's a mostly reasonable position. However, it only highlights the religious nature of the ID movement.

Scientists have, and have had, no problem introducing and briefly discussing odd little ideas that have captured the public imagination yet have little scientific merit. We've never been reluctant to bring up (or address questions by our students) about Hoyle's or Crick's suggestions about panspermia, or any of the ideas about aliens bringing intelligence or life to the planet, as in Clarke's 2001. No one is afraid of these quirky ideas, or concerned that they will contaminate students' minds. We deal with them briefly and move on to more substantial and more powerful ideas.

The problem here is that the ID movement has seized on these nebulous and unsupported ideas and demanded that they be elevated to the status of a central integrating theory in the field of biology. That doesn't make sense from a scientific point of view. The only reason to do that is religious; furthermore, the financial backing of the movement and the stated rationale of all of the major players is entirely religious. Zeal in the absence of any scientific support is a damn good reason to see the movement as sectarian. There isn't enough data in this subject to support a good paragraph in a science textbook, and that's the source of our objections to the demands of the intelligent design creationists.

#1161: Francis J. Beckwith — 03/20  at  12:20 PM
I'm not in a position to adequately assess your comments about "data," though I suspect that others more gifted and knowledgeable than me can address it (though I would guess not to your satisfaction). I should have said in my long-winded response to Jeff (which, I suppose, would have made it long-hurricaned) that I do conclude in my book that there is nothing unconstitutional in teaching ID in public schools. That is, my work deals with the permissibility question, and not the policy question of whether ID should be taught. One of the problems of writing a book like this (whose original version was my Washington University School of Law M.J.S. thesis) on such a narrow question is that people often miss the distinction between constitutional permissibility and good policy. I think it's because in our public consciousness the term "constitutional" has morphed into some kind of political-moral judgment as to the correctness of a point of view. So, for example, people will mistakenly refer to a private boycott of a particular medium (e.g., sponsors of an offensive TV show) as "violating the First Amendment" when in fact the First Amendment is a limit on government power not on private organizing to put economic pressure on another private entity.

You write that "Zeal in the absence of any scientific support is a damn good reason to see the movement as sectarian." But that implies that zeal with scientific support makes it non-sectarian. In that case, the zeal is not the relevant factor in assessing the policy question; it is whether the view can pass muster. This is why, for example, the genetic fallacy is a fallacy. Pointing to the origin of an idea, or the motivation of an agent who embraces the idea, has no bearing on the plausibility of the idea qua idea. For example, given the links on your site, I think it's safe to say that you embrace a naturalist worldview (If I'm wrong, I apologize). If I were to dismiss your view of the nature of science (as an entirely naturalistic enterprise) and your view of knowledge (i.e., science is the paradigm of knowledge and all comers, including theological claims, must answer to it) on the grounds that you are motivated by a particular worldview, you would rightly dismiss my assessment on the grounds that I had committed a flagrant violation of logic.

Just as an aside, when I first heard your name "P.Z. Meyers," I thought, "What a great name for a rap singer." "Tonight, ladies and gentlemen, I present to you, J.Z., P.Z., and 50 cents."

Frank

#1162: PZ Myers — 03/20  at  03:11 PM
Tsk, tsk. Any philosopher should be aware that saying "X is reason to believe Y" does not necessarily imply that "not-X is reason to believe not-Y".


Rap singer? Are you kidding? When someone mentions JZ to us old school biologists, we tend to think of the great JZ Young, J-Zed to those who knew him. Squid! Earthworm giant fibres! If I wanted to flatter myself with exalted company, it would be "JZ, PZ, and JBS" (not that I have any illusions that I would belong there...but maybe I could be a roadie with the band, JZ and the Invertebrates).

#1163: Francis Beckwith — 03/20  at  03:39 PM
Perhaps I was unclear about the logical relationship between premises and conclusions. If I say, for example, X is a sufficient condition to believe Y, then it makes no sense to tell me P's motivation, M, to believe Y. M is logically irrelevant to the relationship between X and Y. In the above scenario, X, as I understand it, is the reason or cluster of reasons offered as warrant for one's belief in ID's plausibility. If, as you claim, X is not sufficient to establish Y, then M's embracing of Y on X is a violation of M's epistemic obligations as a rational agent. Then, M's motivation is an interesting psychological fact about M and how his beliefs are subjectively shaped. But, again, it has no logical bearing on the connection between X and Y. A good thought-experiment is to imagine if all ID advocates who embraced Y based on X were to die all of a sudden. If none were alive, there would be no more minds who could be conscripted as examples of "sectarian motivation" (as you understand it). In the event of such a scenario, the argument--X is a sufficient condition to believe Y--could still be assessed on its merits. In short, M, though interesting, can never really be the point. The genetic fallacy or its close Latin cousin ad hominem, a tempting rhetorical weapon if there ever was one, does not actually do any intellectual work in these sorts of debates.

As far as my rap comment, I should have put the little smilee face next to it. It was a joke, DZ EZ PZ.

Frank